jus
nunc a viminibus pampino coetanis jus deposcit extortum, nunc uvarum liquorem desiderat primitivarum
ladanum dicitur nasci de rore celi, unde dicitur quod ladanum est jus coagulatum cadens super prunas et est calide et sicce complexionis
hoc jus viride, A.warins
jus collex est genus cujusdam collirii fragile et subrubeastrum
juscalcus
si quis vulneratus fuerit in scapulis, ita ut jus, i. e.(mæri [AS: ] exeat, xxx s. emendet [liðseaw ] : glutinum Quad.
nec saltem pingue jus [AS: ] potestis sine arte mea haberebroþ
fac inde jussum
apozema, jus coctarum herbarum
de jure ‥ quo lavatur ‥ ore tantum circumquaque haurit et bibit
comedenti sit sine jure, / cum sale simpliciter, vel jure cibus sale mixto
carnis jus pingue recentis
questio ‥ que fercula molli / jure natent, que sicca gule trudantur Averno
jus, quandoque dicitur pro elixatura carnis quod Anglicebroth vocatur
de juribus non detur jus cicerum nec caulium nec piscorum si sit fluxus ventris
qui ‥ legum Romanorum jura ‥ rimabitur
‘carus sit tibi quoque proximus ut tu.’ hoc pactum jus omne tene
sua monastica jura studeant observare
si ‥ per alium se defendere elegerit et idem interim moriatur, quero quid juris ibi sit, utrum is qui tenet possit se per alium defendere an loquelam debeat amittere an tantum saisinam?
invenit plegios de veniendo ubi et quando et ad faciendum omnia que jura fuerint
volentes in hac parte facere quod est jurium, omnes fructus redditus ‥ sequestrandos
ad cetera facienda et recipienda que juris sunt(
probat legem nature formasse contractus hominum ‥ diu antequam jus gentium incepit
canonica jura(v.
[pars negotialis ] habet in se inplicatam controversiam civilis juris
alioquin jure gentium dissaisiti non placitabunt
consilio et assensu hominum suorum ad quos jus illius terre spectabat
jure civili Romanorum
jus commune
humano jure cautum est ut delatori vel lingua capuletur vel capud amputetur [cf. ] ‥. unde et in jure scriptum est ‘satisdatio malivolum tutoris propositum non mutat’ [GAS 67, 203, 321, 566 ] Digest 26. 10. 6
consuetudinario et seculari jure quam ecclesiastico
de jure canonum
intitulata patent papalia jura
utriusque [i. e. civilis et canonici ] juris perito
duo bachelarii milites, cum uno juris terreni perito
tam Cesareo quam pontificio jure prestantissimum
jus etiam regni hujus municipale, quod jus est altercantium hominum ridiculae sententiae
eodem ‥ anno exercitus Danorum in Anglia Ælfredo ~um super sacrum armillum fecerunt
nisi ~o affirmaret quod ‥ ~o facto ‥
quid aliud promittere potest? naturale jus corrupit, ~um violavit
ne quis alii faciat injuriam vel perperam agat in ~o vel in ordalio(
~um ab eo hujusmodi ceperunt: “jura”, inquiunt, “his verbis”
de jusurando [sic ] suo transgresso
quilibet sacerdos a populo accusatus, si certi non fuerint testes, qui crimini inlato approbent veritatem, jurejurando erit in medio et illum testem proferat de innocentiae suae puritate
Eadfrid ‥ contra fidem jurisjurandi peremtus est
ille dato jurejurando ut rediret ‥ venit ‥
abnegat archiepiscopus, sub jurejurando asserens se neminem alium in regem ‥ laudare
sibique illa vendicando quod suum est, cum jurisjurandi sacramenta recipiat
vera fuisse cum jurejurando coram pluribus satis asseruit
de jure jurandi
unde rex, graviter erga ipsum in animo commotus, jurejurando affirmavit quod nunquam cum illo nisi gladio mediante in vita sua pace pertractaret
eum ad rectum [(v. l. jus ] publicum representet [AS: ]he hine to folcrihte læde
in curia Christiana juri debent parere
juri stabunt(v.
neque nos neque procuratores nostri unquam in jus super hoc vocati fuerimus aut citati
vocari vocareque in jus possunt qui lege non prohibentur
in corde suo cogitabat paterna rura deserere, jura celestia quaerere
Hii ‥ quae videlicet insula ad jus ‥ Brittaniae pertinet
municipatus, jus [ipsius municipis ]
civitatem Cricheladam et ‥ municipium quod Burtuna dicitur, que tunc regii habebantur juris
ecclesias sive capellas in Galweia, que ad jus abbatie de Hij Columchille pertinent
si non te ‥ perditorum infaustus pater ‥ contra jus fasque rapuisset
temnere personas et jus servare solemus
fas erat, jus erat vel justum erat
quod contra jus factum est non valet, ut x Di.: vides, fili carissime, quia quod contra leges accipitur per leges dissolvi meretur [] Digest 10. 10
quis vitam [sc. meruit ]? justus; jus quia salvat eum
si ‥ vallettus ‥ querelam fecerit, sibi faciatis breve jus et maturum, secundum leges
ille contra quem geritur justum bellum, offert jus et vult satisfacere
magistrum et scolares ad jus faciendum pauperibus scolaribus ‥ excitare ‥ velitis
omnia, quaeque polo sunt subter et axe reguntur, / dum Pater arcitenens concessit, jure guberno
hujus doctrinam ‥ Scottorum traditionibus jure praeferendam sciebat
quem [sc. Deum ] bene quisquis amat felix habet; hunc et habendo / omne quod optandum jure videtur habet
cujus nutui et auctoritati se de jure totus inclinat mundus
salvo servitio meo de illis de quibus servitium de jure habere debeo
ecclesiam de B. ‥ vacare comperimus ipso jure
si contra non adquiescentes sententiam aliquam protulisset ‥ ipso jure nulla fuisset juxta regulam illam
depositio ‥ Michaelis ‥ de facto processit et nulla modo de jure
alioquin sit eis institucio nulla ipso jure
haec omnia si canonici haberent sicuti jus esset, valerent ill[a ] lx libras
jus est ut dominio tuo [(Waleys ] jam priveris
totius germanitatis jura propemodum calcitrante
maluit ‥ occumbere quam pudicitiae jura profanando vitam defendere
fidei et castimoniae jura susceperant
quamvis sepe et jure poli et fori ei supradicta auferre possent
hoc nomen jus aliquando accipitur pro jure fori, aliquando pro jure poli
vobis mandamus quod ‥ G. le Conte ‥ arestetis et ipsum prefato Guillelmo de Wyncheles liberetis, tenend’ sicut prisonem suum prout secundum jus armorum et formam treugarum predictarum fuerit faciendum
cum naves fuissent capte jure belli, ‥ ipse eas abire dimisit, accepto ab eisdem vino et pecunia
humanae penitus naturae jura resolvens
contra jus divinum et fas humanum
jus autem civile naturale corrumpere non potest, cum jus civile a naturali aliquando tollatur
[Lazarus ] ille qui vita est in morientibus, aut jam mortuis, jura mortis evacuavit
[Hen. II ] omne jus poli jure fori demutavit
ne ledas jus nature vel jus positivum
si aliquod est animal quod hujusmodi erga prolem non facit, fedus juris naturalis rupit quod natura omnia animalia docuit
cui catholici per preceptum juris Dei communicari non debent
pontifices ex fide regulam vivendi ad vitam eternam posuerunt, a quo etiam jus positivum dicitur
jus regium in ea deinceps nullum repperiatur omnino
sepulturas et quaedam ad jus sacerdotum pertinentia audacter usurpantes
qualitas causarum multa est: emendabilium et non emendabilium, et que solum pertinent ad jus regium(
iste vir [sc. Ranulfus Flambard, episc., ob. 1128 ] hoc habuit quod poscunt jura Dunelmi, / mentem magnificam, munificamque manum
jus vel clamium etc.(v.
erimus ‥ duci ‥ adjuvantes ‥ ad jura sua defendenda et perquirenda
ad conservacionem jurium corone(v.
duos etiam consules ‥ Lucio Hiberio direxit ut suggererent ei quatenus recederet a finibus Gallie, aut postera die ad expetendum veniret quis eorum majus jus in Galliam haberet
in ‥ prejudicium jurium ecclesie(v.
jus regis ‥ est potestas regia quam regaliter dominans exercere poterit super populum suum
concedo ‥ terram ‥ almae Æbbae abbatissae atque carnali propinquitate proximae in Deoque matri monasteriali juri dono perpetuo
agrum ‥ quem ‥ C. in jus ecclesiasticam ‥ donavi
peto versus N. feodum dimidi militis ‥ sicut jus meum et hereditatem meam
me concessisse ‥ Gisleberto de B. totam terram, que fuit Ricardi de Warewico, tanquam jus uxoris sue, filie predicti R. de W.
vendidi ‥ jus meum(v. 1
recognovit ‥ tenementa ‥ esse jus ‥ abbatis
ut ‥ manerium ‥ esset jus ecclesie nostre
ut pleniter persolvant omnia que ad jus ipsius ecclesiae juste competunt scilicet ea que Anglice dicunturciric sceott , ettoll , id estthelon , ettacc , id estswin sceade , et caetera jura ecclesiae
protestantes nos nunquam vel super proprietate vel super possessione earundem decimarum et juris parochialis eis aliquam controversiam esse moturos
salvo jure meo, scilicet xij den.(
castrum de Dynbeyg cum suis juribus valorum duarum milium librarum
dum ea, que juris exilis sunt, promovere et, ediverso, que juris evidentis fuerint, perturbare prevalent et impedire
jure hereditario etc.(v.
homo ille qui hanc terram in qua molina est, tributario jure tenerat
de hiis qui sunt irregulares et suspensi mero jure
cum accio sua non sit de jure mero set de jure mixto cum possessione et per breve quod sapit naturam transgressionis, in quo non est ei necesse verba ad jus merum spectancia pronunciare(
relaxavi eis totam calumpniam et totum clamum et totum jus nativitatis quod unquam habui
[(v. 1terram ] jure coli adquisivi
quietum clamavi ‥ totum jus dotis quod habere clam’ ‥ in j dimidia acra terre
sanguis facit heredem propinquiorem et jus sanguinis excludit masculum et perfert feminam
quietum clamavi omne jus proprietatis et possessionis quod habui ‥ in tota terra ville de L.
habend’ et tenend’ ut de jure viduae
si deberes in Baioariem provinciam jus habere predicationis ‥(
in cunctis vero successoribus hoc jus donationis augendo amplificando satagerint
jus advocationis(v.
de jure patronatus ecclesiae de
sacerdotia etiam gentilia, hoc est quae episcoporum vel nobilium propria essent, qui a vulgo de jure patronatus vocantur ‥
jure dominandi
nec aliquo repetendi jure ‥ fultus
a jure possidendi nulla vis potest habentem jus privare
H. P. melius jus habet tenendi predictum tenementum quam nullus alius et quod propinquior heres est ut de jure sanguinis
nec in terrario specificatur illud jus communicandi
in ipso jure doctorandi(v.
aliquis habens jus aproviare se
abbatem ‥ cujus juri ‥ ipsi etiam episcopi ordine inusitato debeant esse subjecti
eidem genti sacerdotali jure praefuit
non solum suam animam juri diabolico tradens, sed et populorum corda in interitum demergens(
sub jure ‥ abbatum(v. 2
legatus ‥ concilium pro jure legationis sue apud Westmonasterium ‥ coegit
quamvis ex parte sui sint juris
cartam hanc jure meo conscriptam
cum ‥ liberum sit cuilibet juri suo renunciare
dominus rex tunc temporis fuit in custodia comitis Leye’ et non sui juris
si non tenerentur injuriam sustinere et fraudem pati et vellent jus suum ‥ constituerent inter se judices ‥ apud quos ‥ jus suum acquirerent
si se haberet in suo jure discessisset utique
ut ‥ jura teneas maritalis consortii(
evolutis ergo aliquorum temporum curriculis, quibus se conjugalis juris conditionibus indidissent, contigit ‥ ut concipiens pregnasset
[rex coronatus ] tria, interrogante archiepiscopo, jura promisit se servaturum. “in primis promitto ‥ aliud promitto ‥ tertium . ‥” explicitis promissionibus ‥
quod rex Francie amicicias copulavit cum rege Scotie ‥ et cum eo juras [(sic ] et confederationes fecit contra regem Anglie ‥
pro absolutione peccatorum meorum ecclesiastico jure concedo quandam terram ‥
eum percussit cum quadam bescha super caput ita quod obiit die tercia, set habuit jus suum ecclesiasticum
habuit jura ecclesie et obiit
E. dictum J. quodam cultello percussit ita quod iiij die obiit et habuit jura ecclesiastica
➳ gén. pl. jurum Cato Orig. 7, 14 || dat. arch. jure dans la formule jure dicendo Liv. 42, 28.
JUS(in early Latin jous, from Sanscrit ju, to join, and of the same root as jubere, in early Latin joubere) has the following legal senses: 1, law, or a system of law; 2, the place of declaring the law; 3, power or authority; 4, right to do a thing; 5, what is right or lawful = justum; 6, in the plural, rules of law, legal decisions, and so legal authority (Nettleship, Contributions to Latin Lexicography, s. v.; cf. Muirhead, Roman Law, sect, 7).
Jus, in its general signification, is law, and in this sense it includes all law, whether made by statute or otherwise; but in a narrower sense it is, opposed to lex, which is a special written enactment,--strictly, a transaction entered into between the magistratus and the populus (Nettleship, Contributions, etc., who thinks that the usages of lex are in favour of deriving it from ligare, to bind). Lex is sometimes used for law of any kind. Thus Cicero (de Off. 3.5.23) opposes natura to leges, where he explains natura by the term jus gentium, and makes Leges equivalent to Jus Civile (see below). In the Partitiones (100.37), he divides Jus into natura and lex; lex, in this sense, comprehending leges and all the other parts of the Jus Civile. In its special sense of a written enactment, lex is included in jus ; but jus or jura, as distinguished from lex, may mean the special provisions, lex the whole enactment containing them; or jura are special rules or provisions, lex a comprehensive written enactment; or jura may mean the general rules on which leges are subsequently framed (Nettleship, s. v. Jus). So the provision of the Lex Julia de adulteriis, which forbade the alienation of the fundus dotalis, is thus referred to by Gaius (2.62), quod quidem jus, which rule of law or which law --it being a law comprehended in another law which contained this provision. Gaius again (1.47) speaks of the jura or legal provisions contained in the Lex Aelia Sentia. Thus, though lex, in its strict sense of a written enactment, is opposed to jus, and though jus is perhaps never used for a lex, still jus, or rather jura, may be used to express rules of law contained in a lex or a part of a lex. Jura, in the sense of rules of law, is of frequent occurrence, and is combined with the following verbs: describere, dicere, dare, ponere, reddere, petere (Nettleship, l. c.). For instance, Gaius speaks of jura as built up or established by the Responsa Prudentium ( responsa prudentium sunt sententiae et opiniones eorum quibus permissum est jura condere, 1.7). Jus is specially used to signify law as contained in the writings of the Jurists. Jus is sometimes opposed to judicium, a thing being said to be done in jure or in judicio, according as it was done before a magistratus or before a judex. [JUDICIUM] Thus all matters of legal concern were said to be done aut ad populum, aut in jure, aut ad judicem (Plaut. Menaech. 4.2, 18). The expression jus dicere is explained under JURISDICTIOJus, in the sense of the place in quo jus redditur (Dig. 1, 1, 11), is only an application of the name of what is done to the place in which it is done.
Jus was not only the general law of the state, but also the law which a superior, such as the head of a family, was entitled to administer to those subordinate to him. So persons are divided into those who are sui juris,--that is, independent persons; and those who are alieni juris--that is, subject to the law or rule of another. Hence jus signified that which binds, in the sense of power, authority, and from this sense came to mean a right to do a thing. Accordingly, Gaius says (4.3): It is an actio in rem when we claim a corporeal thing as our own, or claim some jus as our own, such as a jus utendi, eundi, agendi. The meaning of a law generally, and of a legal right, are applied to jus by Cicero in the same sentence: I, a man ignorant of the law (imperitus juris), seek to maintain my right (meum jus) by the Interdict (pro Caecin. 11.32). As the several rules of law, which are often comprised in one lex, or which make up the whole body of Jus (Law), may be called Jura with reference to their object; so the several legal rights which are severally called jus, with reference to some particular subject, may be collectively called jura. Thus we find the phrase jura parentis to express all the rights that flow from the fact of legal paternity. The phrase jura praediorum, which is equivalent to servitutes, is explained under SERVITUS
Jus sometimes means the entire property of a deceased person ( successio in jus demortui --in omne jus --heredes juris successores sunt).
Jus is also used to signify the bond or tie of relationship (Dig. 1, 1, 12: Nonnunquam jus pro necessitudine accipimus, veluti est jus cognationis vel affinitatis).
The adjective justum often occurs in the Latin writers, in the sense of that which is consistent with Jus or Law, or is not contrary to law, and especially of that which is in accordance with jus civile as opposed to jus gentium. Thus it is justae nuptiae, marriage according to jus civile, if there is conubium between the two parties to the marriage. Jus, in its general sense of law, is opposed to fas; jus being law made by human authority, fas (from fari) what is declared by divine authority,--the will of the Gods. (Muirhead, op. cit. sect. 7.) The knowledge and determination of what was fas or nefas belonged to the pontifices, except that matters concerning international intercourse were regulated by the fetiales. But the distinction between fas and nefas, or between pium and impium, on the one side, and between justum and injustum on the other, was not clearly marked till the office of praetor was instituted; and so, till this time, the pontifices were the chief interpreters of jus as well as of fas. (Danz, Lehrbuch, &c. § 36.) Still, even after the separation of jus pontificium or sacrum from jus civile, there was a relation between these two branches of law: for instance, an adrogatio was not valid by the jus civile unless it was valid by the jus pontificium (Cic. de Or. 3.3. 3, 136 ; Brut. 42, 156; ADOPTIO), the pontifices having the supervision of privata as well as publica sacra. Again, as it was for the pontifices to determine whether a res was sacra, sancta, religiosa, or profana, so the law relating to res divini, as opposed to humani juris (Inst. 2.1), was derived from jus sacrum, and continued to be partly under its sanction (Macrob. Sat. 3.3;--Dig. 39, 3, 17.3; 11, 8, 5.1).
Those rules of fas which regulated the declaration of war, the conduct of war, and the making of treaties, are comprehended under the term Jus Fetiale. This jus prescribed the formalities which were observed by the Italian nations in their international intercourse (jure gentium agere). It derived its name from the fact that it was under the supervision of the fetiales, a class of priests who acted as the envoys of the state (publici nuntii populi Romani--oratores) in making a formal demand for satisfaction from other states (clarigatio de rebus repetendis), and in declaring war in case of refusal (Danz, § 36). The Romans sometimes used the expression jus gentium in a sense which nearly corresponds to the modern phrase Law of Nations, or, as it is more frequently called, International Law. (Liv. 2.14; 6.1-Z2, quod legatus in Gallos, ad quos missus erat, contra jus gentium pugnasset ; 38.48; Sail. Jug. 22; cf. Tac. Ann. 1.42--fas gentium.) The term jus belli (Cic. de Legg. 2.1. 4) is used in a similar sense.
The conduct of a Roman was regulated by boni mores as well as by jus and fas. Loyalty and obedience on the part of the dependent members of a family to their head (obsequium et reverentia), moderation in the use of their power on the part of superiors (clementia), chastity (pudicitia), and the observance of good faith in dealing with others (bona fides), were among the duties attributed to this source. As Mr. Muirhead (Roman Law, sect. 8) remarks, The constant reference in the pages of both the lay and professional writers to infamia, ignominia, turpitudo, improbitas, as imposing disqualifications, shows how much store continued to be set, theoretically at least, on integrity of character. (See Voigt, Zwölf Taf. 1.15.) The rules prescribed by boni mores were partly included in the sphere of jus, and partly lay outside it. Mores is also used in the sense of immorality (mali mores); that which positive morality disapproves of. Thus, in the matter of the dos, there was a retentio in respect of the mores graviores or majores, i. e. in cases of adultery (Ulp. Fragm. tit. 6). [DOS]
The law of Rome was originally a body of customary law; and though it came in course of time to be based on statute, custom was still regarded as one of its original sources. This is the jus which is said to be moribus constitutum--not to be confounded with boni mores. The ultimate foundation of customary law was considered to be the common consciousness of the people of following a custom in obedience to a rule of law: the evidence of this consciousness is usage--repeated and continued use--longa, inveterata, diuturna, antiquitus probata et servata tenaciter consuetudo (Dig. 1, 3, 32). Lex, statute, and mos (custom) are sometimes opposed to one another, as component parts of the jus civile, but different in their origin. Horace (Carm. 4.5) speaks of mos et lex. The actio injuriarum is said by Paulus (5.4, 6) to have been introduced aut lege aut more aut mixto jure. The Roman writers indeed frequently refer to a large part of their law as founded on mores, or on the mos majorum, and not on Leges (Quintil. Inst. Orat. 5.10). Thus Ulpian (Dig. 1, 6, 8) says that the jus patriae potestatis is moribus receptum.
The Jus Civile or civil law of Rome was divided into publicum and privatum by the Roman jurists (Dig. 1, 1, 1.2; Inst. 1.1, 4). Publicum jus is defined to be that which relates to the status rei Romanae, or the Romans as a state; privatum jus is that which relates ad singulorum utilitatem, that is, to the interests of private individuals. The publicum jus is further said by Ulpian (l. c.) in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistere. (Cf. Cic. de Or. 1.4. 6, 201, publica quoque jura, quae sunt propria civitatis atque imperii.) According to this view, it comprehends the law of religion and constitutional law, and in fact all the rest of the jus civile which is not jus privatum; the latter comprehending the law of status and family law, the law of property and the law of civil procedure, which is the subject of the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian. The elementary treatise of Gaius does not mention this division. Justinian, in his Institutes, after making this division of jus into publicum and privatum, says, We must therefore treat of jus privatum, from which it appears that he did not contemplate treating of Jus Publicum, though the last title of the fourth book is de judiciis publicis, concerning criminal trials, which properly belong to the Jus Publicum.
The law of Rome appears to have been called in early times Jus Quiritium. The expression populus Romanus, quirites, has given rise to much discussion. Becker (Handb. 2.24) concludes that Romani and quirites are so far opposed that Romani is the historical and political name viewed with respect to foreign states, and quirites the political name as viewed with reference to Rome. According to Mommsen, the distinction between Romani and quirites (literally, lance-bearers) is that where the locality was meant to be referred to quiriteswas never used, but always Rome and Romans (urbs Roma, populus, civis, ager Romanus), because the term quiris had as little of a local meaning as civis or miles. For the same reasons these designations could not be combined: they did not say civis quiris, because both denoted, though from different points of view, the same conception in law. On the other hand, the solemn announcement of the funeral of a burgess ran in the words, this warrior has been consigned to death(ollus quiris leto datus); and in like manner the party aggrieved employed the word in calling the burgesses to aid him (quiritare): the king addressed the assembled community by this name; and when he sat in judgment, he spake according to the law of the warrior freemen (ex jure quiritium) quite similar to the later ex jure civili. The phrase populus Romanus, quiritesthus means the community and the individual burgesses (Mommsen's Hist. of Rome, Dickson's transl., ed. 1867, 1.78). Accordingly jus quiritium was equivalent to jus civium, jus civile. Jus quiritium may also mean the entire rights of a Roman citizen, being equivalent to civitas (Gaius, 1.32 c, 33, 35). Jus quiritium is frequently used in connexion with ownership in the expressions dominus, dominium ex jure quiritium; that is, ownership according to the law of the quirites, or jus civile. A lance was the symbol of such ownership. Quiritary ownership was contrasted with ownership in bonis, which was praetorian ownership. [DOMINIUM]
All people, says Gaius (1.1), who are governed by leges and mores use partly their own law (jus), partly the law (jus) that is common to all mankind; for the law (jus) which a state establishes for itself is peculiar to such state, and is called jus civile, as the peculiar law (jus) of that state. But the law (jus) which natural reason (naturalis ratio) has established among all mankind is equally observed by all people, and is called jus gentium, as being that law (jus) which all nations follow. The Roman populus therefore follows partly its own peculiar law (suum proprium jus), partly the common law (commune jus) of all mankind.
According to this view, Roman law (jus) is distributed into two parts, jus gentium and jus civile, and the whole body of law peculiar to any state is its jus civile (Cic. de Orat. 1.44.197). As we see in the Institutes, this was only a division of jus privatum; the Roman private law, therefore, which is peculiar to the Roman state, is its jus civium, or jus civile, that part of Roman law which might also be the law of other communities, was the jus gentium.
The jus gentium is here viewed by Gaius as springing out of the naturalis ratio common to all mankind, which is still more clearly expressed in another passage (1.189), where he uses the expression omnium civitatium jus as equivalent to the jus gentium, and as founded on the naturalis ratio. In other passages he founds modes of acquisition of property, which are not peculiarly Roman in character, on naturalis ratio, and in other places he derives such acquisitions from naturale jus, the naturale jus being the product of naturalis ratio (cf. 2.65, 66, 69, 73, 79). He founds cognatio, blood relationship, on naturalis ratio, and agnatio on civilis ratio, as being. a purely Roman institution (1.158). In two passages in the Digest (Dig. 1.8) he calls the same thing naturale jus in § 2, and jus gentium in § 3, 5 (compare Gaius, 3.132). The naturale jus and the jus gentium are therefore treated by Gaius as identical (Savigny, System, u. s. w. 1.113). Thus Gaius considers jus gentium, as being the law of natural reason, to be older than the jus civile, which is law peculiar to a particular state (Dig. 41, 1, 1, pr.; cf. Inst. 2.1, Il).
But other Roman jurists distinguished jus naturale, the law taught by nature, and so common to men at all times and in all places, from the jus gentium or gentile law of positive enactment.
There were, in fact, legal institutions, especially the important institution of slavery, which could not be reconciled with the identification of jus naturale and jus gentium (cf. Inst. 1.3, 2: Servitus autem est constitutio juris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subjicitur).
Ulpian makes the threefold division of jus--jus civile, jus gentium, jus naturale; but his conception of jus naturale is one which was apparently peculiar to this jurist, though it is unfortunately adopted by Justinian in his Institutes (Inst. 1.2, pr.). Jus naturale, according to Ulpian, est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam jus istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium, quae in caelo, quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur. Hinc descendit maris atque feminae conjugatio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio et educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia istius juris peritia censeri. The foundation of this conception seems to have been a theory of the progress of mankind from what is termed a state of nature, first to a state of society and then to a condition of independent states. This definition had, however, no practical application, and must be viewed merely as a curious theory. Absurd as it appears at first sight, it is capable, according to Savigny, of a reasonable explanation, who shows that Ulpian does not mean to say that beasts have law, but only that they have the matter from which law springs; that is, some of those natural relations on which legal relations are founded exist among beasts as well as men. Such natural relations are those by which the species is propagated. (See also Puchta's remarks, Inst. 1.9, note a.) In the Institutes the two divisions are confounded (1, 2, de jure naturali, gentium, et civili); for the explanation of jus naturale is first taken from the threefold division of Ulpian, and then the jus gentium and jus civile are explained according to the twofold division of Gaius already quoted, so that we have in the same section the jus naturale explained in the sense of Ulpian, and the jus gentium explained in the sense of Gaius, as derived from the naturalis ratio. Further, in the second book (tit. 1, 11) the jus naturale is explained to be the same as the jus gentium, and the jus naturale is said to be coeval with the human race.
The origin of the opposition between jus gentium and jus civile was not a speculative notion, nor did it originate with the jurists, though they gave it a theoretical form. The jus gentium appears to have been in its origin a body of rules which the praetor recognised as governing the relations of aliens at Rome with one another and with Roman citizens, the jus civile being only applicable to cives. It is probable that till some time after the enactment of the Twelve Tables, aliens were incapable of entering into any transaction which could be legally enforced, but the growth of commerce and the settlement of foreigners at Rome during the fifth and sixth centuries occasioned the establishment of a special law, distinguished from the jus civium by its informal and equitable character, treating all freemen as on an equality without consideration of political status. This new law, the jus gentium, was perhaps at first confined to transactions in which aliens were interested, but it soon came to be applied also to the relations of cives; and accordingly Roman private law was composed of two parts, the jus civile or law of cives exclusively, and the jus gentium, the general law of free persons. Jus gentium, then, was law in positive force among the Romans, devoid of national peculiarities by reason of its origin, and so having much in common with law elsewhere, though not, as one might suppose from the language of Gaius, the law actually prevailing in all communities.
The jus gentium was chiefly introduced by the Edictum--as the law of peregrini by the Edict of the Praetor peregrinus and the Edicta Provincialia, and as the general law of Rome by the Edictum of the Praetor urbanus, and by means of leges and responsa prudentium. The conception of the jus naturale was a philosophical one derived from Greece. The preference which the jurists showed to the jus gentium over the jus civile was partly due to the fact that they conceived it to be more in harmony with the law taught to man by an indwelling natural reason (naturalis ratio). Thus the tendency of the jus gentium to supersede the jus civile, instead of existing alongside of it as a parallel institution, was partly due to the influence of the prudentes, the effect of this change being to deprive Roman law to a great extent of its distinctively Roman character.
(For the origin and nature of the jus gentium, see Voigt, Das Jus Naturale, &c.; Muirhead, Roman Law, § 42 ; Nettleship in Journ. of Philol. 13.169 ff.; Contributions to Latin Lexicography, s. v.)
Jus Civile is opposed to the jus praetorium or honorarium [EDICTUM]; and the opposition consists in the opposition of the means or form by which the two severally obtained an existence; whereas the opposition of jus civile and jus gentium is founded on the internal character of the two kinds, and the extent of their application.
The terms jus scriptum and non scriptum, as explained in the Institutes (1.2), comprehended the whole of the private law of Rome (Dig. 1, 1, 6). Jus scriptum signified all law embodied in writing, whatever its source might be, and so in the later history of Roman law comprehended all except customary law (quod usus comprobavit). The sense in which written and unwritten law has been used by English writers is hardly the same as the Roman sense. Hale says (Hist. of the Common Law, p. 2): Those laws that I call leges scriptae are such as are originally reduced into writing before they are enacted. Hale applies his definition only to statutes or acts of Parliament; but it is equally applicable to any rules which are promulgated in writing, and have the force of law or of a law, by virtue of authority delegated to those who make such rules. The division of jus scriptum and jus non scriptum does not appear in Gaius, custom not being mentioned by him as a source of law, but he enumerates the other sources of law which are included by Justinian under the head of jus scriptum.
Law, says Gaius (1.2), meaning the Roman private law (jura), is composed of leges, plebiscita, senatusconsulta, constitutiones principum, the edicta of those who have the jus edicendi, and the responsa prudentium.
This is a division of law merely according to its formal origin. The divisions enumerated by Cicero (Top. 5, 28) are leges (which include plebiscita), senatusconsulta, res judicatae, jurisperitorum auctoritas, edicta magistratuum, mos, aequitas.
The subject-matter of private law is distributed by Gaius, and Justinian in the Institutes, under the heads of the Law of Persons (Jus Personarum); the Law of Things, which is expressed by the phrase jus quod ad res pertinet; and the Law of Actions, quod ad actiones pertinet. In his first book Gaius treats of the Law of Persons in the sense explained in the article INSTITUTIONES; in the fourth he treats of the Law of Actions; and accordingly the second and third contain the Law of Things--that is, the law of property. [INSTITUTIONES]
[G.L] [E.A.W]JUS, VOCA´TIO IN. [ACTIO]